Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts:  Testing the Populist View of the Causes of the Economic Crisis by Colesanti, J. Scott
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 1
2010
Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts: Testing the Populist
View of the Causes of the Economic Crisis
J. Scott Colesanti
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation




LAWS, SAUSAGES, AND BAILOUTS: 
TESTING THE POPULIST VIEW OF THE 
CAUSES OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS* 
J. Scott Colesanti** 
INTRODUCTION 
While the lingering economic crisis has drawn much attention to 
individual products1 and private sector villains2 thought to have caused the 
market meltdown, a pointed study of the full range of government causes 
(and their attendant depth) has to date proven less attractive to authors and 
critics. It is now axiomatic—even among the financial survivors and victors 
of the crisis—that Wall Street fell victim to an unprecedented myopia.3 It is 
commonly accepted that regulation was flawed,4 but the exact degree to 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Folklore attributes the referenced quote, “No one should be forced to see how laws or 
sausages are made,” along with a variety of other constructions, to Mark Twain or Otto Von 
Bismark. See Fred R. Shapiro, Quote . . . Misquote, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 21, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/magazine/27wwwl-guestsafire-t.html; see also Memorable 
Quotes and Quotations from Mark Twain, http://www.memorable-quotes.com 
/mark+twain,a99.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).  
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Board of Directors and the Securities and Exchange Commission. He is on the Board of Editors of 
The Journal of Securities Law, Regulation & Compliance and has served as a securities industry 
arbitrator since 2000. Professor Colesanti is presently teaching Securities Regulation for the 
eleventh straight year. His writings have been published in securities industry journals, law 
reviews, The New York Law Journal and The New York Business Law Journal, and as expert 
commentaries to LexisNexis. He is a co-editor of the “Business Law Blog” at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/. He wishes to thank Kristen A Truver, Hofstra 
University School of Law, Class of 2011, for her research assistance. 
 1. See generally GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE 
AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 
(2009) (detailing the origin, growth, and abuse of credit default swaps between 1994 and 2008). 
 2. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Ratings Downgrade, NEW YORKER, Sept. 28, 2009, at 25 
(noting President Obama’s “well-deserved shots at some of the villains of the financial crisis: 
greedy bankers, reckless investors, and captive regulators” during a speech in New York the same 
month). 
 3. See Jenny Anderson, As Goldman Thrives, Some Say an Ethos Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2009, at A1 (reporting former partners’ words that while Goldman has always sought to 
maximize profits, the bank used to take a longer term view). 
 4. Admissions by regulators of their lapses range from the generic to the pointed. See 
Financial Regulatory Revision: Before the J. Economic Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (unpublished 
written testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the Department of the Treasury), available 
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg413.htm. 
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which any one public sector can be blamed has, like the corresponding 
remedies presently languishing in Congress, been seemingly postponed 
until a consensus can be reached on the ultimate means of ending the 
downturn.5 Moreover, such a direct allocation of culpability may just be a 
condition precedent to our economy’s recovery. For example, the savings 
and loan crisis of the late 1980’s, which led to the demise of over 1000 
regional banks, arguably stopped short of a financial Armageddon because 
Federal Judge Stanley Sporkin lambasted the accounting and legal 
professions.6 The Stock Market Crash of 1987, which was over in less than 
a month, was blamed on those gamblers known as ‘program traders,’ thus 
resulting in new rules designed to shut down the stock exchanges when 
                                                                                                                 
  In the years leading up to the crisis, our financial regulatory regime permitted an 
excessive build-up of risk, both inside and outside of the traditional banking system. 
The shock absorbers critical to preserving stability – capital, margin, and liquidity 
cushions in particular – were inadequate. Outdated, ineffective regulation left our 
system too weak to withstand the failure of major institutions.  
Id.  
  Likewise, Federal Reserve Chairman, Benjamin Bernanke, recently stated “[s]tronger 
regulation and supervision aimed at problems with underwriting practices and lenders’ risk 
management would have been a more effective and surgical approach to constraining the housing 
bubble than a general increase in interest rates.” Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, 
Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A1; see also SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
Executive Summary to INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD 
MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 1 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509-exec-
summary.pdf. (“[T]he SEC received more than ample information in the form of detailed and 
substantive complaints over the years to warrant a thorough and comprehensive examination . . . 
despite three examinations and two investigations being conducted, a thorough and competent 
investigation or examination was never performed.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Sarah Kellogg, Financial Crisis 2008: Where Were the Lawyers?, WASH. LAW., 
Jan. 2010, at 20, available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/ 
washington_lawyer/january_2010/financial_crisis.cfm (“By most measures, the United States 
remains in the grip of a prolonged financial crisis . . . . More than a year after the bottom fell out 
of the U.S. economy, the masterminds on Wall Street and in Washington continue to struggle.”).  
 6. The full quote from Judge Sporkin reads as follows: 
  Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now asserting their rights 
under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly improper transactions were being 
consummated? 
  Why didn’t any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the transactions? 
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions were 
effectuated?  
  What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent involved (both 
accounting and legal), why at least one professional would not have blown the whistle 
to stop the overreaching that took place in this case. 
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (upholding the seizure 
by the OTS of the Phoenician resort and affiliated thrift). 
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daily trading swings proved too volatile.7 Meanwhile, the mortgage debt 
crisis of the early ‘90s lost steam once the Orange County Treasurer went to 
jail and counterparty firms paid unprecedented fines.8 Earlier this decade, 
when a number of large corporations evidenced accounting irregularities, 
specific company management was indicted, prompting a law that obligated 
CEOs and CFOs to swear to the accuracy of financial statements.9 
Mindful of the pressing need for such resolute finger-pointing, this 
Article seeks to provide a cross-boundary analysis of the statutes, 
initiatives, cases, agency decisions, and regulatory reporting lines that either 
paved the way or aggravated the economic crisis of 2007–2010 (the Crisis). 
Accordingly, this Article seeks to test postulates of blame in four distinct 
categories: the enactments of the federal legislature, the decisions by the 
federal judiciary, the mortgage policy of the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) (as steered by the White House), and the 
actions/omissions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
Commission). To that end, this Article identifies the popular wisdom 
concerning the culpability of each government sector, locates predating 
trends in the underlying “law,” and compares the two for a variance. The 
resulting five postulates are summarized as follows: 
 The perceptions of the Crisis’ causes are hindered by the search for 
predicate actions in the past five years, while the true origins of the 
Crisis seem to be rooted in decades past. 
 The more that a perception focuses on an investment product, the less 
illustrative the critique. 
 The contributions to the Crisis by the judiciary and White House 
during its genesis period are, to one degree or another, understated. 
 The ultimate causes for the Crisis may be more subtle and 
atmospheric than direct and empirical. 
 Not only have the laws governing the contributors to the Crisis grown 
outdated, so has our collective ability to levy blame. Until we 
recognize that the nightmare scenario of Wall Streeters victimizing 
the commoner has been supplanted by more complex wrongs, the 
corresponding analysis will continue to stagger and fall short. 
In sum, unlike studies of prior financial crises, the clearest (and least 
self-serving) reconstructions of the most recent catastrophe have been 
undertaken by the financial press. This Article seeks to put such populist 
perceptions to the legal test. Owing homage to the existing literature 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See NYSE, Inc., Dealings and Settlements, Rule 80B (Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary 
Market Volatility) (1998), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp? 
searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_3_4_20&CiRestriction=80B&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/. 
 8. See State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906, 910–13 (W. Va. 1995). 
 9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. §7262 (Supp. 2002). 
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confirming the sins of over-exotic products and profligate spending, this 
Article eschews any focus on private actors (e.g., credit rating agencies) in 
favor of examination of government accelerants and responses (much in the 
same way that a scrutiny of gaming laws confesses the existence of 
gambling but refuses to blame the horses or dice). Overall, this Article 
hopes to contribute to academia a categorical assessment of the service 
offered by the public servants collectively charged with maintaining the 
first line defense against the very economic abyss that continues to threaten 
both national and international markets. Stated otherwise, one should be 
forced to see how meltdowns and bailouts are made, if only to prevent their 
frequent recurrence. 
I. THE POPULIST VIEW ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS 
Although it has become politically expedient to characterize the 
prolonged economic slump as unforeseeable, in fact, nothing could be 
further from the truth. It is the position of this Article that in government, 
industry, and academia, the warning signs were almost as pronounced and 
as old as the seeds of the crisis themselves. Perhaps, when the fear of 
inviting blame has subsided, all parties will accede to this simple truth. 
A. RELEVANT TIMELINE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE SUBPRIME 
MELTDOWN 
Wall Street possesses a time-honored affection for novel investment 
vehicles. While individual residential mortgage loans are insignificant to 
investment bankers, during the relevant years, these mortgages were 
bundled and sold, about half of the time, to entities known as “government 
sponsored enterprises” (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.10 The 
purchases of securitized bundles by GSEs, often called Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs)11 grew rapidly,12 from $81 billion of such securities in 
2003 to $169 billion in 2005.13 
                                                                                                                 
 10 See Zachary A. Goldfarb & David Cho, U.S. Considers Remaking Mortgage Giants, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/05/AR2009080504063.html; see also Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation Act of 1970, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 451 (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1451–1459 (2006)) (chartering Freddie Mac as a GSE in 1970); Federal National 
Mortgage Association Charter Act of 1956, ch. 649, tit. II, § 201, 68 Stat. 612 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1717) (chartering Fannie Mae as a GSE in 1968). 
 11. See infra notes 151, 152. 
 12. See, e.g., SEC Actions Relating to the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Financial Servs. and General Government Operations of the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th 
Cong. 249 (2009) [hereinafter Schapiro Testimony] (forthcoming testimony of Mary Schapiro, 
Chairman of the SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts031109mls.htm. 
 13. Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis: Subprime Loans Labeled 
‘Affordable,’ WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at A1.  
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The Federal Reserve helped spur the growth of the exotic investments. 
The Federal Funds rate was lowered to 1% and kept there throughout the 
2004 fiscal year.14 This prompted lenders to make loans, and to disregard 
vague suitability guidelines.15 In turn, the entities that bought these loans 
shot right past all rational limits on their purchasing ability.16 The result was 
a dramatic increase in a risky category of debt known as “subprime 
lending,” which represented just 8.6% of all mortgage debt in 2001 but rose 
to over 20% in 2006.17 
The growth was also attributable in part to academic hubris. In 2003, a 
University of Chicago professor and winner of a Nobel Prize in Economics, 
haughtily declared that the “central problem of depression-prevention has 
been solved, for all practical purposes.”18 Ultimately, radical credit became 
the must game in town. The now defunct Lehman Brothers ratcheted up its 
debt to leverage ratio from twenty-five times equity to thirty-five times 
equity in one year.19 Surprisingly, instead of inviting scorn, its model 
became the standard to which large firms aspired.20 CEOs quickly learned 
that, regardless of their intuition, unfettered faith in the upswing of the real 
estate market was the only course of action if they intended to prove their 
competitive entrepreneurialism to corporate boards.21 
B. DRAMATIC ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE WELL-HEELED 
In an era characterized by the free flow of money, significant eyes took 
heed. In 2005, insurance giant AIG stopped underwriting CDOs.22 In 2006, 
                                                                                                                 
 14. James Grant, Weekend Journal: Why No Outrage?, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2008, at W1. 
 15. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1 (“The Fed helped stoke the housing market by slashing short-term 
interest rates from 2000 to 2004. The rate cuts drastically reduced the effective cost of buying a 
house, which added more fuel to what was already a powerful housing boom.”). 
 16.  Joseph A. Giannone, Lehman Leverage Still Too High: Einhorn, REUTERS, June 9, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN09178720080609. 
 17. John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect: Annals of Business, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 78. 
 18. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ERA ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF  
2008 9 (2009) (elaborating that the professor was not claiming that the “irregular alternation of 
recessions and expansions” was over, but rather that efforts were better expended in studying 
“long-term economic growth”). 
 19. WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON 
WALL STREET 3 (2009). 
 20. See Devin Leonard, How Lehman Brothers Got its Real Estate Fix, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
2009, at BU1 (citing the comment of one noted analyst that “a lot of Wall Street firms tried to 
duplicate Lehman’s commercial real estate strategy”). 
 21. See, e.g., The Balance Sheet, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/jamessurowiecki 
/2009/01/who-saw-the-dan.html (Jan. 6, 2009) (noting the July 2007 comment by the Citigroup 
CEO that “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”); see also ANDREW 
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON 
FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 14 (2009) (“[L]ike 
everyone else on Wall Street, [Lehman Brothers CEO Richard Fuld] couldn’t pass up the 
opportunities.”). 
 22. See Cassidy, supra note 17. 
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the Consumer Federation of America published its famed report, Exotic or 
Toxic: An Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for 
Consumers and Lenders.23 In February 2007, HSBC, an international 
banking giant, announced that it was reserving $10 billion to cover non-
performing American mortgages.24 The next month, the burgeoning 
scrutiny of bank regulators prompted Senator Christopher Dodd to send 
letters to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and other officials 
decrying lagging supervision of subprime lenders.25 
In March 2007, The Wall Street Journal openly questioned whether 
federal regulators were to blame in the disastrous expansion in subprime 
lending.26 In June 2007, a “seismic quiver” shot up the spine of Wall Street 
when it was disclosed that two Bear Stearns mortgage hedge funds could 
not meet margin calls.27 In September 2007, former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan blandly confessed nearly two months of market 
turmoil, noting that “[t]he human race has never found a way to confront 
[stock market] bubbles.”28 Regardless, that month, the dire news appeared 
in full swing, as a former Federal Reserve Governor turned author reminded 
the public that he foretold that the “predictable result” of the residential real 
estate boom was “carnage.”29 
C. REGULATORY NOTICE 
By the end of the summer of 2007, the brokerage industry’s chief 
regulator put firms on notice that sales of “complex structure products” 
such as mortgage-related securities would be expressly examined.30 The 
catastrophe became a bit more public in the fall, as more storied Wall Street 
firms admitted their bad bets.31 Shortly before Halloween, Merrill Lynch 
                                                                                                                 
 23. ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., EXOTIC OR TOXIC? 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS AND 
LENDERS (2006), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0506.pdf.  
 24. Cassidy, supra note 17.  
 25. Greg Ip & Damian Paletta, Lending Oversight: Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage 
Meltdown; States, Federal Agencies Clashed on Subprimes as Market Ballooned, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 22, 2007, at A1 (Senator Dodd wrote in a letter to regulators that “‘the crisis has been in the 
making for several years, and, in my view, it has taken far too long for the regulators to act.’”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. CHARLES R. MORRIS, Forward to THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, 
HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH, at ix–xviii (2008). 
 28. Greg Ip, Credit Crunch: Greenspan Says Turmoil Fits Pattern, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2007, 
at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118913318976220324.html.  
 29. Greg Ip & Stephen Miller, Remembrances, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2007, at A6 (describing 
the prophecies of Edward Gramlich, who had died days earlier, and his prescient book, Subprime 
Mortgages: America’s Latest Boom and Bust, which was published in June 2007). 
 30. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 07-43 (2007), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/ 
documents/notice_to_members/p036816.pdf.  
 31. Susan Pulliam & Kara Scanell, Pricing Probes on Wall Street Gather Steam: SEC-Led 
Investigations Focus on Public Notice, In-House Discrepancies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2007, at 
C1. 
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reported its first quarterly loss in nearly six years based upon a write-down 
of nearly $8 billion.32 
In December 2007, the SEC and other regulators were said to be 
investigating brokerages regarding the pricing of mortgage securities and 
the need for public disclosure of their rapidly declining prices.33 In the 
presence of $80 billion in write-downs in the last few months of the year, 
the Commission was said to have initiated three dozen investigations.34 
However, such parries were usually tempered by uncertainties. For 
example, since the securities in question were difficult to accurately value, 
an SEC official was concurrently quoted as stating, “We don’t know now 
that we will be recommending any enforcement actions in the subprime 
area.”35 
Private watchdogs were less equivocal. In March 2008, a full six 
months before the newspapers publicized the onset of the Crisis, an 
investment advisor running a consumer friendly website posted the warning 
that “[t]he great credit unwind is upon us. Credit default swaps on all 
brokers, particularly Lehman [Brothers] and Bear Stearns, are blowing out, 
big time.”36 
D. COSTLY STARTS AND STOPS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
Particularly disconcerting throughout 2008 were the unhalting trends, 
unfathomable losses, and unpunished errors. In late January 2008, Merrill 
Lynch, which had written down $10 billion of mortgage-related securities, 
disclosed its intent to abandon the structured credit business.37 The same 
month, New York’s Attorney General Andrew Cuomo directed his staff to 
issue subpoenas and utilize the broad Martin Act to examine whether big-
name firms failed to disclose risks to customers.38 Yet again there was 
trepidation, as the sources for the story concurrently cited unrealistic credit 
firm ratings, thus undermining a direct link to investor harm.39 
In Spring 2008, it was reported that “6.35% of all mortgages were at 
least 30 days delinquent, not including those already in foreclosure.”40 The 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Jenny Anderson & Landon Thomas Jr., Loss and Larger Write-Down at Merrill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/business/24merrill-
web.html.  
 33. Pulliam & Scanell, supra note 31. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. COHAN, supra note 19. “Lehman reportedly has two times [its] capital in [commercial 
mortgage backed securities].” Id. at 11. 
 37. Shanny Basar, Thain Declares Structured Credit Exit, FIN. NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2008, 
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2008-01-31/thain-declares-structured-credit-exit. 
 38.  Kate Kelly et al., State Subprime Probe Takes a New Track, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2008, at 
A3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Michael Corkery et al., Real-Estate Woes of Banks Mount; Lenders Dumping Bad Loans at 
Discount; Regulators See Losses Continuing, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2008, at A1. 
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next month, Merrill Lynch suffered its fourth consecutive quarterly loss, 
writing off another $9.75 billion in assets and bringing its overall write-
downs for the year to $43 billion.41 Separately, banks worldwide reported 
write-downs of $335 billion.42 
The mammoth numbers, at times, seemed to eclipse the severity of the 
official observations. In May 2008, it was disclosed without fanfare by then 
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox that regulators had “discovered a host of 
perverse incentives in the securiti[z]ation process.”43 The confusion and 
pain were hardly reserved for the stock market. While approximately 1.3 
million residential foreclosures took place in 2007,44 by the second quarter 
of 2008, such statistics were up 121%, and it was estimated that 1 out of 
every 171 homes was in foreclosure.45 
While the Dow Jones Industrial Average continued to exhibit a 
remarkably consistent fall (ultimately shrinking approximately 40% in 
2008),46 more entities reevaluated their holdings, leading to further write-
downs.47 Tallies of losses at Citibank and Merrill Lynch reached over $80 
billion by mid-2008.48 Simultaneously, the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve combined forces to prop up the two GSEs owning half of the 
mortgages in the country.49 In October 2008, Congress passed a first bailout 
(valued at $700 billion),50 and the government rescued Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae51 while providing more directed relief to insurance behemoth 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Write-downs Put Merrill Lynch in Red, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2008, at 3. 
 42. Leaders: Barbarians at the Vault, ECONOMIST, May 17, 2008, at 15. 
 43. Joanna Chung, SEC Looks to Subprime Lessons, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at 15. 
 44. Number of Foreclosures Soared in 2007, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22893703/. 
 45. Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, Foreclosure Activity Up 14 Percent in Second Quarter 
(July 25, 2008), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?Channel 
ID=9&ItemID=4891. 
 46.  Yahoo! Finance, Historical Prices for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^DJI&a=11&b=31&c=2007&d=11&e=31&f=2008&g=d (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2010) (detailing the daily drop in the DJIA closing price between Dec. 31, 2007 
(13,264) and Dec. 31, 2008 (8,668)).  
 47.  Michael M. Grynbaum, New Worries About Credit Drive Down Stock Markets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at C1. 
 48. Jon Hilsenrath, Markets Police Themselves Poorly, But Regulation Has Its Flaws, WALL 
ST. J., July 21, 2008, at A2. 
 49.  Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes Over 
Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/business/08fannie.html. 
 50. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the Troubled Assets 
Relief Program). 
 51. Peter J. Wallison & Charles W. Calomiris, The Last Trillion-Dollar Commitment: The 
Destruction of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FIN. SERVICES OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. 
Policy Research, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2008, at 1, http://www.aei.org/docLib/200809 
30_Binder1.pdf; see also Daniel Gross, Saving the People’s Bank of China: Who the Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac Bailout is Really Supposed to Help, SLATE, Sept. 8, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2199564.  
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AIG, amounting to $75 billion.52 In February 2009, Congress provided a 
second, generalized bailout (valued at $787 billion).53 
Ultimately, observers, regardless of political dispositions, agreed on the 
unprecedented myopia in the economic sector that jeopardized a nation.54 
However, outspoken interests comprehended ahead of time that, when it 
came to exotic investments and the new derivatives designed to hedge bets 
thereon, there was much that was dangerously underestimated.55 In sum, the 
Crisis was created due to reckless behavior by its architects, had predictable 
effects, and started with an inordinate amount of attention (and financing) 
being paid to residential homeowners. 
II. WHITE HOUSE HOUSING POLICY: RARELY HAVE SO FEW 
CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH 
A. PERCEPTION 
Early in the Crisis, the press highlighted the previous decision by HUD 
to require GSEs to purchase more loans made to subprime borrowers.56 
That perception posits that the GSEs, ignoring the time-honored dictate of 
Keynesian economics that there is no true liquidity for markets on the 
whole,57 contemplated an ever-increasing source of demand (for both 
homes and CDOs).58 They were drastically wrong. By late 2009, the public 
appeared to overwhelming favor a close, watchful eye over the agencies 
that both prompted the Crisis and later cost so much to prop up.59 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Mary Williams Walsh & Michael J. de la Merced, A Race For Cash at A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 2008, at C1; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, A Blind Eye to a 
Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A1. 
 53.  See Economic Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
subjects/u/united_states_economy/economic_stimulus/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010) 
(referencing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (2009)). 
 54. See, e.g., Laurence Grafstein, The Real Banker Boondoggle, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 
2009, at 23, 22–23. “[W]e can acknowledge that every major commercial and investment bank in 
the United States faced a direct threat to its insolvency arising from (a) its level of leverage, (b) its 
interrelationships with other leveraged institutions—‘counterparties’—and (c) its reliance on 
short-term funding from those counterparties.” Id. at 22. 
 55. Ip & Miller, supra note 29. 
 56. Leonnig, supra note 13. 
 57. “[T]here is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a whole.” John 
Cassidy, Rational Irrationality; Annals of Economics, NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 2009, at 32 (quoting 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 139 
(Atl. Publishers & Distrib. 2006) (1964)).  
 58. Greg Ip, His Legacy Tarnished, Greenspan Goes on Defensive; Future of U.S. Financial 
Reform Is at Stake; ‘I Am Right,’ WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2008, at A1. 
 59. See Nick Timiraos, U.S. News: Support Grows for Fan-Fred Plan: Proposals to Reshape 
Mortgage Firms Call for Retaining Public-Private Structure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at A7 
(“A consensus appears to be growing among academics, investors and housing experts that the 
federal government should retain a role in the U.S. mortgage market over the long term . . . .”). 
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B. DETAILS 
Upon closer inspection, the ground floor of the baleful “own a home at 
no cost” strategy had been built by the White House about fifteen years 
before.60 Thereafter, a trifecta of U.S. Chief Executives, from both parties, 
consistently combined to lower the financial thresholds to home 
ownership.61  
In November 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) designed to, among 
other things, provide federal assistance to the planning and financing of 
conversions of public housing projects from private rental to ownership.62 
Among other things, NAHA: 
 
(1) proposed a $25.5 billion budget for HUD in 1992;63  
 
(2) established a “National Homeownership Trust” within HUD to 
provide assistance for first time buyers;64  
 
(3) permitted HUD mortgage insurance up to 98.7% of the 
appraised value of the property;65 and  
 
(4) made permanent the maximum single family mortgage loan 
limit of $124,875.66 
 
Symbolically, NAHA signaled the start of nearly two decades of 
assistance for those who failed to meet traditional minimal requirements for 
mortgages: 
[NAHA] puts power in the hands of people. First, it authorizes a major 
administration initiative: Homeownership and Opportunity for People 
Everywhere, the HOPE Initiative. HOPE will provide new opportunities 
for low-income families to buy their own homes—urban homesteaders, if 
you will—and helps the residents of public housing to buy their own units. 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Leonnig, supra note 13; see also Ann Mariano, Panel Rejects Housing Money Transfer; 
Kemp Requested Funds for HUD’s Ownership, Rental Initiatives, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1991, at 
A7.  
 61. Leonnig, supra note 13. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) § 323, Pub. L. No. 101-
625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (b)(2) (2006)). 
 64. NAHA § 302 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12851 (2006)). 
 65. NAHA § 324 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(2) (2006)). 
 66. See generally NAHA, tit. III (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 42 
U.S.C.). 
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Tenant management, control and, ultimately, ownership of public housing 
is an idea whose time has come.67 
Several years later, the torch was relayed by President Clinton’s 
“National Homeownership Strategy.”68 The National Homeownership 
Strategy “loosened mortgage restrictions” for first time buyers by insuring 
loans, eliminating the requirements that borrowers either prove prolonged 
stable income or be interviewed in person, and allowing lenders to hire their 
own appraisers,69 thus creating the potential for inflated valuations. The 
ensuing tactics, which utilized such measures from the 1970s as the 
Community Reinvestment Act70 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,71 
furthered these goals by, respectively, encouraging banks to lend to 
formerly ineligible customers and penalizing/fining banks that refused to 
lower credit standards.72 Subsequently, in 1995, President Clinton 
acquiesced to guidelines that would allow GSEs to receive credit for buying 
“subprime” securities as packaged products of loans creating affordable 
housing.73 
Then in 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Zero-Down 
Payment Act.74 Addressing the needs of first time buyers of single family 
dwellings, this law authorized $200 million in assistance with down 
payments. The results were dramatic: By 2007, 29% of home mortgages 
were estimated as originating with absolutely no down payment.75 
Additionally, in 2004, HUD guidelines were made even more favorable 
to financially challenged homeowners and purchases rose dramatically.76 
Between 2004 and 2006, GSEs purchased $434 billion in securities backed 
by subprime loans.77 In hindsight, these guidelines served merely as 
frightening yardsticks, as neither HUD nor the GSEs possessed the 
capability of filtering the underlying CDO loan data to inspect individual 
loans.78 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See George Bush, XLI President of the United States, Remarks on Signing the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (Nov. 28, 1990), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19101. 
 68. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial 
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANK INST. 5, 25–26 (2009). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2906 (2006). 
 71. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2811 (2006). 
 72. Moran, supra note 68, at 26–28. 
 73. Leonnig, supra note 13; see also Moran, supra note 68, at 28. 
 74. Zero Downpayment Act of 2004, H.R. 3755, 108th Cong. (2004).  
 75. Moran, supra note 68, at 30. 
 76. Leonnig, supra note 13. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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C. COMMENTARY 
Despite the persistent attempts by the press and others to pigeonhole the 
Crisis as the result of overreaching homeowners,79 it seems facile to link 
foreclosure statistics to any burgeoning, disastrous desire for upward 
mobility. Reliance upon credit had been the hallmark of the middle class for 
decades, and the last eight years arguably adhered to this discernible trend.80 
Between 2002 and 2007, credit card debt in this country increased over 
20%.81 Between 2002 and 2005, personal bankruptcies shot up about 32%,82 
and only ceased its upward trend because of changes in federal law that 
made bankruptcy discharges more difficult.83 By 2008, the length of an 
average car loan was often extended beyond six years, as buyers saddled 
themselves with additional payments and interest.84 
More on point, the decision to employ HUD as the financier of, and 
repository for, new, untested mortgage-related products far predated any 
watershed presidential choice in or around 2004.85 More significantly, to 
order agencies into lesser standards may be politically popular, but from a 
regulatory standpoint, such moves risk disjointed implementation and 
unprepared supervision. For example, banking regulation is notoriously 
fragmented, with no less than five federal entities sharing duties of setting 
policy, overseeing operations, and enforcing statutes and rules.86 The 
collective presumption that these fiefdoms would maintain order during the 
prolonged festival thus proved fatal. 
D. A MILLION NEW GUNS IN A TOWN WITHOUT A SHERIFF 
The notion of the Federal Reserve as a strong banking regulator is 
misplaced. History recalls the system as originating to preserve banks (as 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See, e.g., Robert Holmes, Who’s to Blame for the Economy? Homeowners, 
THESTREET.COM, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10470251/whos-to-blame-for-
the-economy-homeowners.html. 
 80. Stacy Johnson, A Chance to Learn from the “Greatest Generation,” ATL. J. 
CONSTITUTION, Feb. 25, 2010, at A17. 
 81. Press Release, Credit.com, Five Shocking Credit Card Debt Statistics, 
http://www.credit.com/credit_information/debt_help/Five-Shocking-Credit-Card-DebtStatistics. 
jsp (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
 82. See ABI World, Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year (1980–2008), 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=57826&TEMPL
ATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
 83. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
 84. See Mellody Hobson, Recession Rescue: Tackle Your Auto Loan Debt, ABCNEWS.COM, 
Feb. 26, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/MellodyHobson/story?id=4170624&page=1. 
 85. See Morgenson, supra note 52. 
 86. See SEC, Banking Regulators, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bankreg.htm (last visited Feb. 
20, 2010) (listing the five federal banking regulators); see also COHAN, supra note 19, at 19–20, 
49–50 (detailing the role of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in attempting to discern 
the financial condition of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and describing the concurrent efforts of the 
Federal Reserve and the SEC to obtain the same information). 
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J.P. Morgan himself had done in the Panic of 1907) and continuing as 
guarantor of the “elevated risk” game.87 The Federal Reserve system is 
notoriously fragmented, comprised of twelve regional Federal banks, 
which, per the Banking Act of 1913, have nine member boards made up of 
leaders in the private sector.88 It is safe to say that the system was designed 
foremost to buoy mortgagees, a goal that is assisted by other federal 
regulators and their regional subdivisions who, in unison, work to facilitate 
credit to banks.89 For example, in the summer of 2007, it was the Atlanta 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board that extended its line of credit to 
Countrywide Financial to the tune of $22 billion. From 2003 to the third 
quarter of 2007, Countrywide’s SEC filings disclosed that its operating cash 
flow deficits were a cumulative $38 billion, mostly financed from federal 
loans.90 Moreover, the Federal Reserve and Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS), two of the larger bank regulators, rarely bring disciplinary actions 
and were reportedly encouraged by the George W. Bush Administration to 
focus on growth.91 Indeed, the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve serving 
in any role as a regulator has been openly questioned.92 
The traditional governmental fragmentation and multiple purposes of 
those fragmented parts resulted in the opportunistic new residential 
mortgaging business lines falling across one, several, or no lines of federal 
supervision. As The Wall Street Journal reported: 
In 2005, 52% of subprime mortgages were originated by companies with 
no federal supervision, primarily mortgage brokers and stand alone 
finance companies. Another 25% were made by finance companies that 
are units of bank holding companies and thus indirectly supervised by the 
Federal Reserve, and 23% by regulated banks and thrifts.93 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, The Next Financial Crisis, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 2009, 
at 24. 
 88. Sudeep Reddy, Fed Tightens Rules on Regional Directors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2009, at 
A6. 
 89. Eric Dash, New Worries for Next Tier of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at B1; Eric 
Dash, Four Major Banks Tap Federal Reserve for Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at C10. 
 90. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 154. 
 91. Ip & Paletta, supra note 25.  
Regulators appointed by President Bush often have been more sympathetic to industry 
concerns about red tape than their Clinton administration predecessors. When James 
Gilleran, a former California banker and bank supervisor, took over the OTS in 
December 2001, he became known for his deregulatory zeal. At one press event in 
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Id. 
 92. See KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 172–74 (“The Fed is set up to do two main things: 
manage interest rates and, when necessary, provide cash to banks.”). 
 93. Ip & Paletta, supra note 25. 
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A more granular examination of the government’s liberalized home 
lending programs perhaps only clouds the issue of detecting the precise 
problem years. HUD statistics for New York households between 1998 and 
2008 disclose that assistance to family households of “very low income” 
increased 5% to 6% percent annually during the decade, with the exception 
of 11% in the year 2006,94 a full three years after the passage of the Zero-
Down Payment Act. What does seem readily apparent is that, starting in 
1990, HUD’s coffers had been generously opened, leading generically to 
alternative terms of financing and specifically to a nation of home loan 
intermediaries actively seeking a plethora of mortgagors.95 Not surprisingly, 
home ownership among the lower income households soared. 
The point to be stressed is that various presidents in the last twenty 
years wielded the power of promising homes to the tenant masses.96 The 
more complex notion that investment professionals could turn this well-
meaning refrain into lucrative portfolios seemingly separated from those 
home loans would, of course, need the support of more than just an elected 
official with a potentially short tenure. Thus, the more exacting study may 
center on the jurists who, during the key years preceding the crisis, helped 
to formally signal that Washington, D.C. was a friend and not a foe to 
expansive notions of capitalism. 
III. THE JUDICIARY: SOMETHING IN THE AIR . . .  
Scant attention has been paid to the role of the federal judiciary in the 
nation’s current economic woes. While commentators occasionally noted 
the difficulty in reaching employers and third parties under the Supreme 
Court’s holding in the Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc. case,97 overall, cases from last decade affecting the duties of corporate 
America have largely escaped scrutiny in the national soul-searching that 
continues into 2010. 
To be sure, the aggressively speculative economy, laid bare in late 
2008, neither arose in a season nor originated because of one discreet cause. 
While it may be impossible to delineate the extent to which such an 
economy takes direction from the courts, what does seem apparent is that 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a critical federal bench, sounded a series 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (HUD), HOME Program Income Limits (1998–
2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/home/limits/ 
income/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). The figures were arrived at through analysis of the 
varying assistance totals for the 4-person home in New York during the decade. Id. 
 95. Leonnig, supra note 13. 
 96. See supra notes 60–95 and accompanying text. 
 97. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166–67 (2008) 
(holding that aiders and abettors could not be held liable as secondary actors in private securities 
fraud cases brought under Rule 10b-5). This decision essentially reaffirmed the Court’s holding 
nearly 15 years prior in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 
191 (1994). 
2010] Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts 189 
of harmonious notes in the laissez-faire symphony between the years 2003 
and 2008.98 
A. BACKGROUND – SOME NEW LIMITS ON AN OLD FRIEND TO 
INVESTORS 
In July 2003, a number of securities class actions simultaneously met 
their dismissal in the District Court for the Southern District of New York.99 
Riding on the tail of the monumental “Global Settlement” concluded by 
then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, the actions sought damages 
from highly compensated brokerage firm analysts accused of tainting their 
research in favor of issuers sought by firms.100 The Southern District of 
New York’s decision rested upon a strict reading of privity, essentially 
holding that an analyst could not be liable to a stranger.101 The decision 
marked a new period of strict construction for SEC Rule 10b-5,102 the 
elastic anti-fraud prohibition outlawing everything from internet securities 
fraud to insider trading. 
The Supreme Court took up the cause of limiting Rule 10b-5 via a 
number of key decisions between 2005 and 2008. In Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Court limited the types of defendants 
that could be sued in securities class actions.103 In Merrill Lynch v. Dabit,104 
the Court broke with precedent in accepting a broad definition of securities 
“purchaser” for purposes of removing a class action against Merrill Lynch 
to federal court where it could more readily be dismissed under the Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998.105 As previously noted, also in 2008, the Supreme 
Court precluded “scheme liability” in private securities actions based upon 
Rule 10b-5 in Stoneridge.106 
Apart from constrictive interpretations of securities fraud cases, the 
Supreme Court also helped to conserve business assets by limiting 
penalties. Specifically, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 
873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 99. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Rep. Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing a securities class action against Merrill Lynch); Pfeiffer v. Goldman 
Sachs & Co., No. 02 Civ. 6912-HB, 2003 WL 21505876, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003) 
(dismissing a class action suit against Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, and Morgan Stanley). 
 100. See Landon Thomas Jr., Judges Reject Suits Blaming Analysts for Losses, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 2, 2003, at C1. 
 101. See In re Merrill Lynch Co. Research Rep. Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (“Merrill 
Lynch and the Fund are not the insurers of Plaintiff’s investment in a highly speculative sector of 
the market where the omissions complained of are not adequately alleged to have been the 
proximate cause of the loss.”). 
 102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008) (“Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices”). 
 103. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). 
 104. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006). 
 105. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 106. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–60 (2008). 
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drastically reduced punitive damages in the longstanding dispute over the 
oil company’s devastating spill in Alaska.107 Most noteworthy, successful 
attacks in the D.C. Circuit on the very authority of the SEC to demarcate 
lines of corporate responsibility put the Commission’s legislative authority 
under slow but consistent siege.108 
B. THE LIMITS ON SEC RULEMAKING 
A closer inspection of the decisions of three key circuits within the last 
decade reveals a curious about-face in a region traditionally favoring 
regulation. Specifically, while cordial deference to Commission rulemaking 
has been consistently exhibited in the Second109 and Ninth Circuits,110 in the 
Goldstein v. SEC (2006),111 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC (2006),112 and 
Financial Planners v. SEC (2007)113 decisions, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals dealt rare victories to market voices challenging SEC hegemony. 
In fact, these unrelated, but equally bold rulings, can be said to have both 
tilted the battle for business opposition to regulation and helped create the 
excessively entrepreneurial philosophy now blamed for Wall Street’s 
myopic risk-taking. 
1. Goldstein (2006) 
In late 2004, the SEC announced its “hedge fund rule,” which required 
advisers to hedge funds with (1) $30 million in assets and (2) fifteen or 
more investors, to register with the Commission.114 Thus, this Rule would 
have the effect of bringing subject hedge funds onto the SEC radar 
screen.115 The Rule, which had been passed on a 3-2, partisan vote among 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008). 
 108. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 
873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 109. See, e.g., Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 302 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(upholding SEC Rule 3a12-3 by finding that Commission notices and the rule itself satisfied the 
required “adequate statement of basis and purpose” set forth by § 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act); Gryl ex rel. Shire Pharms. Group PLC v. Shire Pharms. Group PLD, 298 F.3d 
136, 145 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e must defer to the SEC’s interpretations of its own regulations in its 
amicus briefs unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations.”); United 
States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) ([W]e note that in O’Hagan the Supreme 
Court held, as this Court had held previously, that [SEC] Rule 14e-3 was a valid exercise of the 
SEC’s rulemaking authority.”) (citation omitted)).  
 110. See, e.g., Dreiling v. Am. Express Co., 458 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the 
creation of SEC Rule 16b-3(d), setting forth three exemptions from the Securities Exchange Act 
Section 16(b) reporting requirements, was a similar valid exercise); Meyers v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co., 249 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding Regulation M as a proper exercise of SEC 
rulemaking authority).  
 111. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884. 
 112. Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d at 909. 
 113. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d 481. 
 114. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
 115. See id.  
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SEC Commissioners,116 centered on an expanded definition of “clients” 
advised by the firm. Traditionally, if the number of such clients (or groups 
of clients) was fifteen or less, no registration was required.117 Petitioners, a 
hedge fund and investment firm, took issue with the new definition, and the 
D.C. Circuit Court agreed.118 
The D.C. Circuit Court’s criticisms of the SEC stance ranged widely. 
Noting that the term “hedge fund” had never been adequately defined,119 
and that the Rule appeared to be a direct response to the press generated by 
the failure of notorious Long-Term Capital management,120 the court 
suggested that the SEC, by seeking to compel registration of individuals 
affiliated with entities traditionally exempted by both the Investment 
Advisers Act (IA Act) and the Investment Company Act, had departed from 
the statutes.121 
Additionally, the court’s analysis seized upon the comments of the two 
SEC dissenters to the Rule’s adoption.122 Ultimately finding the hedge fund 
rule to be capricious, the court concluded that the, “Commission’s rule 
creates a situation in which funds with one hundred or fewer investors are 
exempt from the more demanding Investment Company Act, but those with 
fifteen or more investors trigger registration under the [IA] Act. This is an 
arbitrary rule.”123 
The unanimous court thus struck down the hedge fund rule more than 
eighteen months after its issuance,124 leaving those hedge funds that had 
duly registered with the option of continued registered status.125 More 
globally, a trillion dollar industry which had been publicly faulted for a lack 
of supervision,126 was left unsure of regulatory expectations either at the 
government or customer level. 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See id. at 72,089 (Comm’rs Glassman and Atkins, dissenting). 
 117. See id. at 72,054. 
 118. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874–76 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 119. Id. at 874–75 (“The term appears nowhere in the federal securities laws, and even industry 
participants do not agree upon a single definition.”). 
 120. Id. at 877. 
 121. Id. at 875–77; see also Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-6(a)(5)(A)(iii) (2006); 
Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006). 
 122. Goldstein, 451 F.3d. at 878. 
 123. Id. at 884. 
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 125. See Floyd Norris, Court Says S.E.C. Lacks Authority on Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June 
24, 2006, at A1 (noting that “nearly 1,000” hedge fund advisors had registered with the SEC as 
required by the stricken rule). 
 126. See, e.g., Dale Oesterle, J. Gilbert Reese Chair in Contract Law at Moritz College of Law, 
Ohio State University, & David Skeel, S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Debate on Legalaffairs.org: Should Hedge Funds be 
Regulated (Nov. 8–11, 2005), available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_ 
hedgefunds1105.msp. 
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2. Chamber of Commerce (2006) 
The same year as Goldstein, the Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber), 
the industry group traditionally speaking for corporate management,127 
launched its second challenge in as many years at SEC authority. In 
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, the famed trade association took aim at the 
Commission’s response to trading scandals that had tarnished the 
traditionally non-controversial mutual fund industry.128 
Specifically, the Chamber took issue with the SECs revamped 
“investment company governance” rule129 where it required that (1) the 
board Chair at all mutual funds be independent of the fund’s adviser, and 
(2) 75% of the mutual fund board be independent of the fund adviser.130 
The Chamber’s three-pronged attack alleged that the SEC (1) had exceeded 
its rulemaking authority under the IA Act,131 (2) had offered no justification 
for the changes, and (3) had failed to abide by § 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act132 in promulgating the amendments. 133 
The last argument was adopted by the D.C. Circuit, which, in elevating 
such details as cost estimates and the recordkeeping attending SEC 
rulemaking, stated the following: 
In sum, the combination of circumstances—inadequate notice that the 
Commission would base its cost estimates for the two conditions on 
‘publicly available’ extra-record materials on which it did not typically 
rely in rulemakings; the Commission’s acknowledgement that the 
rulemaking record contained gaps and did not include reliable cost data; 
the availability of additional implementation data for the period between 
the close of the rulemaking record and the Commission’s response to 
Chamber I as more funds adopted the conditions; the Chamber’s colorable 
claim that the Commission’s failure to consider such implementation data 
harms its investment choices—suffices to show that the Chamber has been 
prejudiced by the Commission’s reliance on materials not in, nor merely 
‘supplementary’ to, the rulemaking record.134 
By focusing on the mechanics of the process, the D.C. Circuit Court 
thus vacated the two new conditions implemented by the SEC (i.e., 75% 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, About Us, http://www.uschamber.com/about/ 
default.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2010). 
 128. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 129. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 
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outside directors and an independent director).135 The financial services 
industry thus saw the nearly sacrosanct imprimatur of Commission 
rulemaking again sullied, and the mutual fund industry returned largely to 
its prior management protocols. 
3. Financial Planners (2007) 
The next year, Financial Planners Association, the umbrella group for 
the nation’s investment advisors, successfully challenged the Commission’s 
rulemaking.136 Again the D.C. Circuit proved inhospitable to SEC claims, 
albeit, this time, its written decision spoke more directly to agency 
legislative authority.137 
For decades, the securities industry, home to both registered “broker-
dealers” and the more heavily regulated “investment advisors,” had 
operated under the SEC guidance that the two groups were separated by 
considerations of compensation.138 The traditional dividing line was 
cemented in 2005 via an SEC rule139 serving as a minefield for brokers 
wishing to avoid becoming subject to the IA Act. 
The Financial Planners Association challenged the 2005 codification as 
discriminatory in that its constituency was being held to a higher legal 
standard despite the inroads upon its services being made by broker-dealers 
and the accompanying expansion of the traditional notion of “merely 
incidental” investment advice.140 In vacating the rule, the D.C. Circuit (by 
2-1 vote) held that the statutory language was clear on the topic of 
exemptions, that the SEC rule was in direct conflict with Congressional 
intent, and that IA Act subsection (f) was “not a catch-all that authorizes the 
SEC to rewrite the statute.”141 
The fallout from the decision was considerable. Countless brokerage 
accounts treated by firms as outside of the dictates of the IA Act faced 
reclassification, while their handlers faced uncertainty, at best, and 
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 136. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Address at the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Ninth 
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2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 19, 2005). 
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 141. Id. at 491. 
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violations, at worst.142 The industry’s immediate response was to clamor, 
unsuccessfully, for the SEC to request a rehearing before the D.C. 
Circuit.143 The long term strategy focused on interim Commission relief to 
ease the transition from compliance with one law to two.144 
C. MESSAGE AND AFTERMATH 
Thus, in the years that the market engines were revving to 
unprecedented calibrations, and its chief drivers speeding with an 
unfathomable amount of gas, the message from the circuit housing the 
SECs headquarters was clear: Even in expertised matters generally enjoying 
deference, the agency’s rulemaking is not always legal.145 Such ciphers 
would be mildly dangerous in quiet times; while the market was 
overextending itself through “toxic” vehicles, they were outright crucial. 
As 2010 unfolds, courts occasionally remind observers that the 
judiciary shall play a role in the resolution of the economic crisis.146 
However, such considerations of courthouse rebuke may still be a distant 
second to an examination of the laws written, rewritten, or modified 
between 1999 and 2002. 
IV. CONGRESS: WHERE LAWS, BAILOUTS, AND MELTDOWNS 
ARE MADE 
A. PERCEPTIONS 
A critically popular 2009 film documentary cataloguing the woes of 
subprime mortgagors commenced with this provocative summary: 
To understand why this [market] is like a gambling casino, you have to 
understand what’s at stake here. On a December evening, December 15, 
                                                                                                                 
 142. News Alert, W. Hardy Callcott & Kevin Zambrowicz, Bingham McCutchen, SEC 
Rulemaking Authority Takes Another Hit: Fee-Based Brokerage Rule Vacated (Apr. 1, 2007), 
http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=4940. 
 143. Press Release, Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Assoc. (SIFMA), Fee-based Account Decision 
Should be Reheard SIFMA Tells SEC (Apr. 10, 2007), http://www.sifma.org/news/ 
42771328.shtml. 
 144. Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Dir. and Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to 
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_ 
letters/59130958.pdf. 
 145.  See generally Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Goldstein v. 
SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
 146. See, e.g., Mark Fass, Judge Slashes ‘Fat Cat’ Bank’s Bill for Subpoenaed Documents, 
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202437287242 
(describing the rejection by a Brooklyn, New York, judge of the request by a third party 
(JPMorgan Chase) for reimbursement of costs attending document production in a case centering 
on the confirmation of an arbitration award). The judge, noting the President’s reference to “fat cat 
bankers” during a recent interview on television’s 60 Minutes, wrote “[t]his Court is not a 
collection vehicle to further enrich already rich bankers.”Id. 
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2000, around seven o’clock, Phil Gramm, Republican Senator of Texas, 
then chair of the Senate Finance Committee, walked to the floor of the 
Senate and introduced a 262 page bill - as a rider to the 11,000 page 
appropriation bill - which excluded from regulation the financial 
instruments that are probably most at the heart of the present meltdown. 
He not only excluded them from all federal regulation, but he excluded 
them from state regulation as well, which is important because these 
instruments could be viewed to be gambling instruments, where you’re 
betting on whether people will or will not pay off their loans. And he 
announced at the time that this measure would be a boom to the American 
economy, and be a boom to Wall Street, because they would be freed of 
any supervision in this regard. And that lack of supervision freed Wall 
Street to essentially shoot itself in both feet.147 
The referenced vehicles are known as credit default swaps (CDS), 
which are non-exchange traded, counterparty agreements which allow the 
transfer of credit risk from one sophisticated party to another.148 A 
somewhat novel derivative, the CDS does not fall within the jurisdiction of 
any relevant federal regulator.149 Indeed, the term itself, “credit derivative,” 
occasionally invites skepticism. As a noted journalist has written, credit 
derivatives “are fashioned privately and beyond the ken of regulators—
sometimes even beyond the understanding of executives peddling them.”150 
These private insurance agreements grew in popularity as nearly 
unfathomable amounts of investment bank inventory were filled with 
CDOs, defined generically as asset-backed securities, which were “backed 
by a pool of bonds, loans, and other assets.”151 Amorphous and ill-
understood, the CDO, unlike the CDS, has fallen squarely within SEC 
jurisdiction as a “security.”152 
                                                                                                                 
 147. AMERICAN CASINO (Table Rock Films and Argot Pictures 2009) (quoting Michael 
Greenberg, Director for Trading and Markets, Commodity Futures Trading Commission) 
(emphasis added). 
 148. See generally Credit Default Swap, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
c/creditdefaultswap.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2010); see also AMERICAN CASINO, supra note 147.  
 149.  Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, available at 
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 152. See Caroline Zimmerman, SEC Opens Subprime Probe, NEWSER.COM, June 27, 2007, 
http://www.newser.com/story/3580/sec-opens-subprime-probe.html (describing a dozen 
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Less amorphous is the regulatory zeal with which powerful market 
regulators embraced the creativity of the private sector to fashion these 
investments. It has been aptly documented that former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan ideologically opposed regulation of credit 
derivatives.153 In the late 1990s, as the SEC gained moderate, indirect 
ground by requiring that firms include “quantitative disclosure of market 
risks” in financial statements,154 the drive at other agencies to inspire 
exposure did not lose steam. At a speech in Florida in March 1999, 
Greenspan openly exhorted the market utility of credit derivatives: 
By far the most significant event in finance during the past decade has 
been the extraordinary development and expansion of financial derivatives 
. . . . The fact that [over-the-counter (OTC)] markets function quite 
effectively without the benefits of [CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission) regulation] provides a strong argument for development of a 
less burdensome regime for exchange-traded financial derivatives . . . . 
These new financial instruments . . . enhance the ability to differentiate 
risk and allocate it to those investors most able and willing to take it. This 
unbundling improves the ability of the market to engender a set of product 
and asset prices far more calibrated to the value preferences of  
consumers . . . .155 
B. THE LAW 
The ensuing Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
(CFMA)156 included various sections aimed at exempting OTC derivatives 
dealers from CFTC jurisdiction. The most direct of these sections reads as 
follows: 
SEC. 103. LEGAL CERTAINTY FOR EXCLUDED DERIVATIVE 
TRANSACTIONS. 
                                                                                                                 
Commission investigations into CDOs, defined as “shared debt packages reliant on faltering 
subprime mortgages”); see also FINRA, Improving Examination Results (May 2008), 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/ImprovingExaminationResults/p038526 
(cautioning firms that FINRA examiners review “recommendations in new and non-conventional 
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products” for customer suitability); see also Complaint at 5, ¶ 13, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. 
& Fabrice Tourre, No. 10 CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
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 153. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html. 
 154. See Joe Nocera, Risk Management: Were the Measures Used to Evaluate Wall Street 
Trades Flawed? Or was the Mistake Ignoring Them?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 26. 
 155. TETT, supra note 1Error! Bookmark not defined., at 75 (quoting a March 1999 speech 
by Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan) (internal quotations omitted). 
 156. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763A–365 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
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Section 2 of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2, 2a, 3, 4, 
4a) is further amended by adding the following to the end: 
(d) EXCLUDED DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL—Nothing in this Act…governs or applies to 
an agreement, contract, or transaction in an excluded commodity 
if – 
(A) the agreement, contract, or transaction is entered 
into only between persons that are eligible contract 
participants at the time at which the persons enterinto the 
agreement, contract, or transaction; and 
(B) the agreement, contract, or transaction is not 
executed or traded on a trading facility. 
(2) ELECTRONIC TRADING FACILITY EXCLUSION.—Nothing 
in this Act . . . governs or applies to an agreement, contract, or 
transaction in an excluded commodity if – 
(A) the agreement, contract, or transaction is entered 
into on a principal-to-principal basis between parties trading 
for their own accounts or as described in section 
1a(12)(B)(ii); 
. . .  
(C) the agreement, contract, or transaction is executed or 
traded on an electronic trading facility.157  
When combined with definitions found in § 105 and § 106 of the 
CFMA,158 the above provisions succeeded in exempting from the definition 
of futures (and thus, CFTC examination) OTC derivative transactions 
between sophisticated parties, away from a stock exchange—a category that 
would later become synonymous with credit default swaps.159 Separate 
modifications to the two primary securities laws were designed to erase the 
SEC from the equation.160 
Among the authorities not altered by the CFMA were: (1) banking 
jurisdiction, (2) SEC fraud jurisdiction, and (3) extraterritorial reach (which 
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was nonexistent both before and after the CFMA).161 As has been also 
noted, the exclusion, albeit the incarnation of Greenspan’s dreams, 
nonetheless successfully precluded oversight of the new vehicles by any 
single regulator.162 Professor John Coffee of Columbia University School of 
Law later testified that the CFMA achieved its goals: 
In my judgment, the [current energy derivative] Amendment does not 
“undo” the desirable legal certainty that the CFMA created. The original 
uncertainty that led up to the CFMA arose because both the SEC and the 
CFTC could dispute whether a complex derivatives transaction was more 
like a futures contract (in which case the CFTC had jurisdiction) or more 
like an option (in which case the SEC arguably had jurisdiction). Nothing 
in the . . . Amendment will change the fact that the SEC is now totally out 
of the picture, as the CFMA amended both the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 193[4] to deny the SEC any authority over 
OTC derivatives (financial and non-financial).163 
C. COMMENTARY 
Freed from the oversight of both the SEC and the CFTC, market 
players thus embarked on a course of internecine capitalism. The largest 
investment houses over-leveraged themselves by stockpiling CDOs, while 
having the risk of such ventures cushioned through reliance on 
[unregulated] CDS agreements with third parties.164 
But the populist view, that any emphasis in the CFMA on imposing 
legal certainty was subordinated to commercial interests, supposes three 
things: (1) that derivative businesses sprung up after the CFMA; (2) that 
SEC and CFTC examiners, if given the chance, would have been able to 
timely intervene; and (3) that anyone was capable of understanding the 
exotic instruments at issue. Sources indicate that nary one of these 
suppositions is reliable.165 
First, the CFTC crusades to gain sovereignty over the swaps market had 
repeatedly fallen short in the past. Perhaps overshadowed by a larger, 
ongoing debate concerning sovereignty over futures,166 regulation of swaps 
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ultimately fell irreparably behind the market,167 forcing Congress’ hand in 
2000 in adopting any feasible measure to address the issue. 
Second, the CFMA was hardly a one-sided law. What is often 
overlooked is the fact that Congress simultaneously (and somewhat 
inexplicably) expanded the express scope of § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act to cover the newly exempted, non-security.168 Thus, the 
CDS, while not subject to registration or routine examination, could be the 
subject of a fraud case. The Commission routinely relies on such cases to 
deter deleterious market behavior by professionals not subject to 
registration requirements.169 
Concurrently, the courts have not blindly applied the CFMA’s blanket 
exemption. The most frequently cited (and pointed) example is Caiola v. 
Citibank, N.A.,170 a Second Circuit decision from 2002. In that case, a 
sophisticated individual specializing in the trading of Philip Morris Co. 
stock, engaged in synthetic option transactions to offset equity swap 
agreements.171 The complex arrangement was motivated by the desire to 
shield the size of the plaintiff’s positions from the market in general.172 The 
defendant bank was alleged to have, at some point, secretly countered the 
complicated plan by effecting large trades that mirrored the plaintiff’s 
synthetic transactions.173 
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The Second Circuit, adhering to the text of the CFMA only insofar as 
the effective date of the Act and its exemption were concerned, effectively 
confirmed the uncertainty surrounding application of the securities laws to 
the exotic products both prior to and after 2000.174 Finding Caiola’s equity 
swaps from the late 1990s were not securities (and thus not subject to Rule 
10b-5), the court simultaneously concluded, “[h]ad Caiola entered into his 
synthetic stock transactions after the enactment of the CFMA, they clearly 
would now be covered under Rule 10b-5” pursuant to the statutory 
exemption.175 
Moreover, the court simultaneously found the synthetic options to fall 
within the statutory definitions of securities.176 Ruling contrary to some 
federal court precedent,177 the Second Circuit rejected Citibank’s contention 
that only an option on a security would be covered by the law, and “not an 
option based on the value of a security.”178 Relying upon the language of  
§ 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act, the court answered the question 
of “whether a cash-settled over-the-counter option on Philip Morris Stock 
similar to options commonly traded on the market” was a security in the 
affirmative.179 
This result is disturbing at best, for applicable § 206 of Gramm-Leach- 
Bliley Act (GLBA) had expressly defined “swap agreements” to include 
options “based, in whole or in part, on the value of, any interest in, or any 
quantitative measure or the occurrence of any event relating to” securities 
or other assets.180 Regardless, the end result was that the plaintiff—who was 
found to have hedged non-security swap agreements with security over-the-
counter options—earned a reversal of the dismissal of his complaint and his 
day in court, despite the contrary goal of the CFMA.181 
Separately and subsequently, the Second Circuit in 2009 both animated 
the CFMA and reminded observers of one of its purposes in SEC v. 
Rorech.182 In that insider trading case, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York refused to grant judgment for the defendants 
on jurisdictional issues, noting: 
In 2000, Congress passed the [CFMA], which amended § 10(b) to extend 
the rules promulgated by the SEC under § 10(b) to prohibit fraud, 
manipulation, and insider trading (but not the SEC’s prophylactic 
reporting requirements), and judicial precedents decided under § 10(b), to 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Caiola, 295 F.3d at 331. 
 175. Id. at 327. 
 176. Id. at 324.  
 177. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (S.D. Ohio 1996). 
 178. Caiola, 295 F.3d at 325. 
 179. Id. at 325–26. 
 180. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 206, 113 Stat. 1338, 1393–94 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 78c (2006)). 
 181. Caiola, 295 F.3d at 330–31. 
 182. SEC v. Rorech, No. 09 Civ. 4329, 2009 WL 4729921 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009). 
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“security-based swap agreement[s] (as defined in [§] 206B of the 
[GLBA]). . . .  
. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . In this case, the face of the contracts does not reveal whether a 
material term of the CDS was based on a security. . . . In any event, it 
cannot be that traders can escape the ambit of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by 
basing a CDS’s material term on a security, but simply omitting reference 
to the security from the text of the CDS contract.183 
The decision also cited a separate Southern District of New York case 
for the premise that the “economic reality” of the instruments and the 
public’s expectations of their nature” govern definitional debates.184 Thus, a 
key circuit in the battle against securities fraud has on several occasions 
subjugated the CFMA to larger notions, thus jeopardizing that legislation’s 
legacy as a purely pro-business advancement.185 
Third, it has always been within the authority of both the SEC and 
CFTC to expand their respective jurisdictions to examine exotic products.186 
An example of this can be seen in the March 2008 accord between the two 
agencies, hastily drawn in response to calls from the Treasury Department 
to merge the dueling entities. That agreement contained “specific principles 
to guide future consideration of novel products, with the goal of reviewing 
product filings expeditiously, providing legal certainty for participants, 
encouraging market neutrality and choice, and enhancing innovation and 
competitive growth.”187 In short, the overriding goals of the CFMA could 
be met at any time with two strokes of agency pens. 
Likewise, it bears noting that, even post-catastrophe, a consensus could 
not be reached that the SEC and CFTC should be merged to end turf wars 
and solidify jurisdiction. Although the goal was prioritized by the “Treasury 
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Blueprint”188 for regulatory reform released by the Department of the 
Treasury in March 2008, the idea fell out of favor in the successor 
administration as political forces acknowledged that historically distinct 
Congressional committees would not accede to a loss of oversight power.189 
Simply put, if the turf war between securities and commodities regulators 
were truly to blame for billions in losses, it would have been remedied by 
now. 
Thus, the perception that the CFMA opened the floodgates to 
unregulated products is, at best, simplistic. The more edifying examination 
might then be a study of the GLBA.190 
D. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT 
Amidst a relatively tranquil bull market, and a growing concern of 
foreign competition, Congress moved in the waning months of the Clinton 
administration to eradicate the last barrier to financial entity consolidation, 
the Glass-Steagall Act.191 The barrier had been erected by § 20 of the Glass-
Steagall Act which, for over 60 years, forbade affiliation in any manner 
between a bank and any “organization engaged principally in the issue, 
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution” of securities.192 
Exceptions of the statutory, administrative, and judicial nature had 
reduced the barrier to something less than absolute. Namely, § 16 of Glass-
Steagall expressly permitted banks of the 1930s to continue to buy and sell 
securities “solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers.”193 
Also, litigation later clarified that banks could purchase brokerages that 
provided only “incidental services” to customers (i.e., that did not render 
investment advice).194 Most importantly, government agency guidelines 
established that bank ownership of securities, capped by a percentage 
threshold, was permissible.195 
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1996) (amending the interpretation of “engaged principally” as stated in Section 20 of the Banking 
Act of 1933 to increase “from 10 percent to 25 percent the amount of total revenue that a nonbank 
subsidiary of a bank holding company . . . may derive from underwriting and dealing in securities 
. . .”); see also Frontline: The Wall Street Fix (PBS television broadcast May 8, 2003). 
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Nonetheless, perhaps primarily as a symbolic gesture, Congress 
removed all technical barriers to conglomeration.196 Later on, the statute 
clarified the presumed breadth of the term “financial” activities by, among 
                                                                                                                 
I think it’s pretty clear to say that [Citigroup CEO] Sandy Weill forced the hand of 
Congress. I think it’s equally clear to say that the Fed forced the hand of Congress to do 
something that they knew full well could not be done. What they said was, ‘At the end 
of two years, if [Glass-Steagall was not repealed], you [Sandy Weill] will have to 
disgorge.’ But everyone up here said, “Oh my. We can’t do that to our dear friend 
Sandy Weill.” 
The Wall Street Fix, supra (quoting Representative John Dingell (D. Mich.), commenting on the 
Federal Reserve’s granting merging Citigroup Inc. and Salomon Inc. a 2-year exemption from the 
prohibition of Glass-Steagall before its repeal in 1999). 
 196.  The operative language of the GLBA, which amended Section 4 of the Bank Holding Act 
of 1956, reads as follows: 
SEC. 103. Financial Activities 
(a) In general.—Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 
U.S.C. 1843) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsections: 
(k) Engaging in Activities That Are Financial in Nature.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsection (a), a financial holding 
company may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the shares 
of any company engaged in any activity, that the Board, in accordance with 
paragraph (2), determines (by regulation or order)– 
(A) to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; 
or 
(B) is complimentary to a financial activity and does not pose a 
substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the 
financial system generally . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . .  
(5) ACTIONS REQUIRED.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Board shall, by regulation or order, define, 
consistent with the purposes of this Act, the activities described in 
subparagraph (B) as financial in nature, and the extent to which such 
activities are financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity. 
(B) ACTIVITIES.—The activities described in this subparagraph are 
as follows: 
(i) Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or 
safeguarding financial assets other than money or securities. 
(ii) Providing any device or other instrumentality for 
transferring money or other financial assets. 
(iii) Arranging, effecting, or facilitating financial transactions 
for the account of third parties. . . .  
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, § 103(a), 113 Stat. 1138, 1342, 1345 (1999) 
(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
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other things, authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to permit banks’ 
involvement with “[l]ending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, 
or safeguarding financial assets other than money or securities,”197 
“[p]roviding any device or other instrumentality for transferring money or 
other financial assets,”198 and “[a]rranging, effecting, or facilitating 
financial transactions for the account of third parties.”199 
The authority to exempt was thus detailed and replete, and the passage 
of the law invited universal praise. The press reported that the bill had 
passed easily and constituted “one of the most significant achievements this 
year by the White House and the Republicans leading the 106th 
Congress.”200 Likewise, Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers was quoted 
as saying that the “historic legislation” would “better enable American 
companies to compete in the new economy.”201 
E. COMMENTARY 
Critics of the allocation of blame to the GLBA note that, while the act 
did formally repeal Glass-Steagall, it was well known within financial 
circles that the 1987 appointment of Alan Greenspan as Federal Reserve 
Chairman signaled a move away from the artificial distinctions between 
commercial and investment banks.202 Further, a defense of the GLBA has 
surfaced. This position asserts that, even with the benefit of hindsight, the 
law is laudable because it has permitted floundering investment banks to 
continue as commercial banks.203 
What appears undeniable, however, is that the GLBA publicly raised 
the stakes; the law created a financial world where the largest players had to 
engage in the most speculative strategies to compete. As one award-
winning financial journalist summarized: 
The repeal of Glass-Steagall legitimized the concept of combining 
commercial and investment banking to construct ‘one-stop-shopping’ 
empires, and many more mergers quickly followed, not just across 
different sectors of finance but across national borders, too. The formerly 
stodgy German commercial lender Deutsche Bank announced that it was 
purchasing the freewheeling Bankers Trust. Deutsche also hired a large 
chunk of Merrill Lynch’s former trading group, tasking them with creating 
a derivatives business. Credit Suisse, the once-dull Swiss group, grabbed 
DLJ, another American broker. The industry was rapidly adjusting to a 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Stephen Labaton, Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Bill Easing Bank Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 1999, at A1. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See, e.g., Clyde Mitchell, Ten Years After Gramm-Leach-Bliley: A Defense, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 
16, 2009. 
 203. Id. 
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new reality that banks needed to be big and offer a full range of services in 
order to compete at all.204 
Most importantly, the resulting data is unavoidable. Lehman Brothers, 
in efforts to transform itself from a “second-tier bond trading shop into a 
full-service investment bank,” took sizeable real estate positions on to its 
balance sheets (resulting in short-lived but significant profits in years such 
as 2006).205 Between 2007 and 2008, Lehman raced from twenty-five times 
leveraged to thirty-five times leveraged.206 The ensuing market demise has 
been sublime: A company whose stock traded over $80 a share in 2007 has 
seen the price ride under $1 a share since mid-September 2008.207 Overall, 
euphoric visions of rising to the level of a multi-service financial power led 
the 158-year old firm, like other entities, to hazardously ratchet up its asset-
debt ratio to precipitate its own ruin.208 
AIG remains the most illustrative case in point. The enormous CDS 
business attributed to that troubled giant was housed in a London subsidiary 
titled “AIG Financial Products” (AIGFP).209 AIGFP dates from the late 
1990s and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC or any insurance 
regulator. Most tellingly, since 2004 (i.e., post-GLBA), it has been overseen 
by the OTS.210 Such a line of supervision seems obtuse in that, based upon a 
CDS portfolio of approximately $500 billion, the subsidiary generated $250 
million in annual insurance premiums by 2007.211 
F. AFTERMATH 
In the wake of the Crisis, a wide variety of pending federal remedies 
attested to the quantifiable change in Congressional mood, as well as the 
diversity and specificity of that deliberative body’s interest, once adequately 
provoked. Bills introduced in 2008 and 2009 would have mandated 
shareholder say in corporate governance,212 reinstated the stock exchanges’ 
                                                                                                                 
 204. TETT, supra note 1, at 73.  
 205. Leonard, supra note 20. 
 206. COHAN, supra note 19, at 1. 
 207. See the company’s historical stock quotes at MarketWatch.com, Lehman Bros. Historical 
Stock Quotes, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/LEHMQ (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
 208. In September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. See Press Release, Lehman Brothers, Holdings Inc. Announces it Intends to 
File Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition; No Other Lehman Brothers’ U.S. Subsidiaries or Affiliates, 
Including its Broker-Dealer and Investment Management Subsidiaries, are Included in the Filing 
(Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/091508_lbhi_chapter11_announce.pdf. 
Various authors, journalists and critics have posed the unanswered question as to why that entity 
did not receive a government bailout. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 52 (referencing the federal 
officials who “let Lehman die”). 
 209. Morgenson, supra note 52. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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“uptick rule” abolished by the SEC in 2007,213 imposed uniform 
requirements on mortgage loan originators,214 legislated registration of 
hedge funds,215 expanded the prosecutorial authority of the SEC,216 created 
a “systemic risk monitor” to oversee all markets,217 or clarified the 
regulation of credit default swaps.218 
Such legislative solutions offered by the nation’s highest deliberative 
body may best signal that effective regulation was always within 
Washington’s grasp. Stated bluntly, there would likely be no AIG bailout in 
2008 or 2009 but for the GLBA eradication of business restrictions imposed 
after the Great Depression in the absence of replacement safeguards. 
There is a postscript on the deleterious effects of the GLBA. While it 
was to be expected that established entities would increase their presence in 
other markets, the GLBA also created a new type of company on the 
regulatory scorecard, the Financial Holding Company.219 Certain of these 
entities would fall through the cracks of existing lines of federal 
supervision, leading to one of the most embarrassing of SEC failures in 
recent years.220 
V. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: 
DECISIONS TOO WEAK TO DEFEND? 
A. PERCEPTIONS 
The negative perceptions of the SEC seemed to have coalesced in the 
nation’s recent, trying times. An under-funded and generally inept SEC 
failed to foresee the dangers in the growing use of leverage and the 
dramatic alterations in industry relationships. Further, acquiescence to the 
White House’s conservative views on regulation under George W. Bush 
                                                                                                                 
 213. H.R. 302, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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endangered market participants.221 The dangers hit home when the Madoff 
scandal broke and it was manifestly clear that red flags had been ignored. 
As a result, the agency that so often boasted of serving as “the investor’s 
advocate,” celebrated its 75th birthday by fighting to justify its existence.222 
Indeed, the perception has been perpetuated, somewhat, by the 
Commission’s post-President Bush management, which has repeatedly 
cited growing obligations and scarcity of Congressional funding as largely 
to blame for the inefficiencies of recent years.223 As cited by current SEC 
Chairwoman Mary Schapiro, during the most critical years of the Crisis, the 
Commission saw its modest staff of approximately 3600 employees reduced 
by 10%, a decline attributed to “several years of flat or declining 
budgets.”224 As has been concurrently noted, even before the agency 
assumes any proposed registration responsibilities for hedge funds and 
private equity firms, it already oversees 12,000 public companies; 4600 
mutual funds; 11,300 investment advisers; and 5500 broker-dealers.225 
Further, the budgetary defense for the agency’s failures has thus, at times, 
resulted first and foremost in a polarized debate between Congress and 
Commission officials,226 resulting in the delay of significant reform. 
B. DETAILS 
But staffing and budgets in the years 2005-2008 do not appear as 
stultifying as Commission officials may claim. The SEC’s own numbers, as 
evidenced in its annual Performance and Accountability Reports for 2005 
and 2008, showed that when compared to 2005, the SEC was more 
successful in 2008 for obtaining Enforcement results (92% vs. 91%), 
reducing the time necessary to review corporate filings (25.2 days vs. 26.1 
days), and increasing the percentage of timely resolved Self Regulatory 
Organizations (SROs) rule filings (86% v. 80%). In addition, the percentage 
of investment adviser and mutual funds registrants examined in 2008 
remained the same as in 2005 (14%).227 Moreover, while the Commission 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
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208 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
may have continued to evidence its traditionally high attrition rate among 
employees there was no departmental collapse, as the multi-purposed, 
widespread structure of the agency remains intact.228 Further, the 
Commission is quick to tout its prompt, dedicated responses to the Crisis, 
all of which belies any budgetary paralysis.229 
Separately, while the journalistic trend is to lampoon the efforts of the 
SEC to follow leads or detect overwhelming frauds,230 the problem runs 
longer and deeper than any missed tips. Commencing in 2000, and perhaps 
reaching a crescendo in 2004, the SEC, albeit understaffed and strife with 
political interference, deliberately and consistently pursued ill-advised 
courses of action with direct consequence to the market. 
Three such questionable interpretations at the Commission warrant the 
most scrutiny: (1) the easing of traditional net capital restrictions for broker-
dealers; (2) the reluctance to impose regulation on credit ratings agencies; 
and (3) the avoidance of any restrictions on burgeoning margin lending to 
customers. 
1. The Consolidated Enterprise Compromise of 2004 
It is now axiomatic that the SEC erred when, in April 2004, it privately 
agreed to a relaxation of the net capital rules in favor of the largest broker-
dealers.231 The agreement (acquiesced to by all five Commissioners) 
permitted the nation’s largest financial service firms to legally “upstream” 
funds to their Bank Holding Companies, thus freeing up millions in funds 
for purchase of exotic investments.232 The ugly compromise233 has received 
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2010] Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts 209 
far-reaching attention in the years since, even inviting scrutiny from such 
off-topic popular periodicals as Rolling Stone Magazine.234 
i. Purpose of (and Relief From) 15c3-1 
Since 1965, SEC Rule 15c3-1 has been in force.235 The Rule serves at 
least three purposes: (1) avoidance of dependence on customer funds; (2) 
efficient operation of markets; and (3) deterrence to violative conduct.236 
The Rule is generally perceived as establishing “early warning 
thresholds.”237 Concurrently, even errors in (or omissions of) requisite 
calculations are disciplinable.238 
It was thus no coincidence that the largest financial firms came to the 
SEC seeking relief from the strict and ubiquitous net capital rule before 
feeling comfortable with the now notorious rush to unprecedented 
leveraging.239 The SEC expressly responded, via a formal rule interpretation 
allowing certain broker-dealers to utilize a “voluntary, alternative method of 
computing deductions to net capital.”240 In return, this short list of firms 
agreed to a heightened internal alarms system and to subject its holding 
company and affiliates to “group-wide Commission supervision”(termed 
Consolidated Entity Supervision).241 
In fairness to the Commission, the hazardous move was made, at least 
in part, to obtain jurisdiction over investment bank holding companies who 
were not subject to U.S. bank regulators because they did not own 
commercial banks,242 and in a climate of urged competitive deregulation. 
The financial press, in particular, gave much attention to the notions that the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 had so encumbered American businesses with 
red tape that their European counterparts were raising money cheaper and 
faster.243 Nonetheless, Consolidated Entity Supervision was, by all 
accounts, a disaster. With the express blessing of their most immediate 
regulator, the largest broker-dealers facilitated leveraging at the parent 
company level that would reach Biblical proportions. Both the ensuing 
blurred ledgers and billions in losses were unprecedented. 
ii. Aftermath 
Consolidated Entity Supervision was de facto terminated via the 
inevitable and involuntary transformation of its participants: two of the five 
holding companies filed for bankruptcy, two converted to commercial 
banks to avail themselves of federal funding, and one merged.244 As an 
ongoing concept, the notion was tersely, but resolutely, abolished by the 
White House’s Financial Reform Plan of June 2009.245 In view of the 
massive monies freed for speculation, the consistent criticism thereof, the 
relatively weak motives for the move and the immediate remedy by the new 
White House, the variegated form of accounting does seem justifiably 
blamed for a large share of the Crisis. But SEC inaction in other areas was 
just as harmful. 
2. Unregulated Credit Rating Agencies 
Investment banking houses could only grow their CDO inventories to 
unspeakable proportions if a third party was blessing them. The top three 
ratings agencies thus served as the seal of approval for an investment that 
was, at best, misunderstood. As one Wall Street Journal writer tersely 
described the phenomenon: “Rating firms became a crutch.”246 
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Regarding ratings agencies, the SEC was, and still is, the law. Although 
the statutory responsibility of the Commission to oversee national credit 
ratings agencies has been sketchy, the fact remains that the Commission has 
exercised its authority to designate such agencies since at least 1975.247 
 The SEC floated the idea of formal rating agency registration in 1997, 
but the idea was received in lukewarm fashion by the industry.248 In 2003, 
the Commission invited public comment on new rules for the agencies.249 
That SEC Release perhaps begged the question of just how conflicted the 
rating game had gotten when it asked the industry the following question: 
“Is it appropriate to require strict firewalls between the broker-dealer 
employees who develop internal credit ratings and those responsible for 
revenue production?”250 
Nearly fifty commenters weighed in on the release, often in stark 
terms.251 An accounting professor at MIT outright called for the 
requirement that credit rating agencies disclose the source of their 
revenues.252 State regulators in Texas expressly suggested that agencies be 
required to adopt procedures addressing issuer and subscriber 
“influence.”253 
Many commentators on the 2003 release expressly opined that the 
credit rating agency demarcation had outlived its utility;254 credit rating 
agencies needed to be regulated in the same manner as the companies they 
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rate,255 or under a separate scheme altogether.256 One commentator 
exhibited clairvoyance when he suggested that the SEC act “in a timely 
fashion to provide these answers now, instead of after some (another) 
financial or stock market calamity.”257 
Between 2003 and 2006, the SEC did nothing tangible in response to 
the comments. In 2006, Congress took up the task and passed the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act.258 That law called upon the Commission to 
implement new rules, which it did in 2007.259 The timeline thus edifies that 
the agency, uneasy with a supervisory role it inherited by default, simply 
shunned final action until it was ordered by Congress. Of course, the credit 
rating agencies, unfettered by meaningful regulation in the years preceding 
the Crisis, profited mightily from the “issuer pays” system that produced so 
many questionable evaluations of CDOs.260 
3. Unwillingness to Tighten Margin Lending 
One area where the SEC’s oversight ability is not subject to claims of 
vagueness is margin lending. However, the primary purpose of the margin 
rules (those unique limitations on the initial purchase of stock) has all but 
been forgotten. The constraints were originally designed to protect Wall 
Street from itself.261 Indeed, scholars remain stunned by the fact that 
brokerage houses in the 1920s were lending customers 95% of the purchase 
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value of their securities.262 If not the incontrovertible cause of the Great 
Depression, it was most certainly an aggravating factor.263 
Thus, in 1934, when the Securities Exchange Act was adopted, § 7 
therein264 delegated margin rulemaking authority to one agency: The 
Federal Reserve Board (the Fed). The Fed adopted famed Regulation T,265 
which, since 1974, has capped the amount that a brokerage house may lend 
a retail customer for the initial purchase of most stock at 50%.266 After that 
day of purchase, margin is regulated by the brokerage houses themselves 
(who routinely set “house rates” that are stricter than the 25% set by the 
stock exchanges).267 The problem, simply stated, is that the more brokerage 
houses lend, the more money they make, and the temptation has never been 
eradicated.268 
In prior crises, regulators worked feverishly to rein in the amount of 
consumer credit on Wall Street. For example, in the Spring 2000, both the 
Fed and the Commission publicly questioned the increased amount of 
margin being afforded American investors.269 The stock exchanges 
themselves subsequently threatened to tighten lending rules governing their 
membership.270 The scrutiny of broker-dealer lending culminated in SEC 
approval of an National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rule 
change obligating firms to delivering a uniform disclosure statement on the 
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Id.  
 264. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2006). 
 265. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1–220.12 (2009). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Rule § 431 (2008), available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/ 
NYSE/Rules/ (follow “General Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Operation of Member 
Organizations (Rules 325 – 465)” hyperlink in sidebar). 
 268. See Gretchen Morgenson, Something Borrowed May Leave Market Blue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 2000, at 3.1 (stating “lending money to investors is very lucrative for these firms; they reap 
both margin interest and extra commissions from investors buying twice the stock they would 
have otherwise”). 
 269. See, e.g., Knight Tribune News Service, Use of Margin Buying Soars to the Chagrin of 
SEC, FLA. TIMES UNION, Apr. 2, 2000, at H5. 
 270. See Margin Credit Fell in April, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2000 (“The NASD said last month 
that it would prod the NYSE to join it in trying to toughen margin requirements.”). 
214 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
dangers of margin investing to all existing and potential margin 
customers.271 Whether it was because of the scrutiny, the rule change, or 
both, margin debt fell at both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
NASD firms in 2001.272 
But as time passed, so did the scrutiny. Between 2002 and 2006, margin 
totals increased 60% at NYSE firms and over 200% at NASD firms.273 Such 
brokerage houses effect trades for hedge funds and other speculators, all of 
which were allowed to increase their leverage. For some, the lack of new 
margin rules or tightened regulations was hardly a surprise. In fact, 
commentators had casually expected the administration of George W. Bush 
to effectuate its professed desire to ease up on business regulation.274 
Perhaps more than anywhere else, that drive reached fruition in the 
everyday world of stock brokerage. Thus, any survey of SEC 
actions/omissions precipitating the Crisis must note the agency’s reluctance 
to tighten margin lending, which credit enabled untold market losses. 
C. STATUS 
The dedicated hesitancy of the Commission to rein in Wall Street’s net 
capital, credit rating, and lending practices inevitably leads to cries by 
journalists and practitioners alike of political intervention.275 The anger has 
spread to academics, who are quick to also point to the dubious timing of 
many SEC trial tactics.276 
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Still others steadfastly defend the agency, the abolition or subordination 
of which does seem to be both premature and impractical.277 The more 
enlightened approach parses the myriad SEC responsibilities, according 
high marks for prosecutions and low ones for oversight of financial 
planning.278 
The latest words of reform accentuate the difficulties in detection. 
Specifically, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, 
among many other changes, would create the interagency Financial 
Services Oversight Council to oversee systemic risk, identify “systemically 
important companies and activities . . . [and] resolve jurisdictional disputes” 
between federal agencies.279 Likewise, a new Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency would focus on consumer financial activities, including 
mortgage loan practices and disclosures.280 As the inclination to re-tool the 
government arsenal gets set to weather political storms, the more accurate 
appraisal (and obtainable result) may posit that the Commission must 
simply set more consistent priorities and make better choices, or once again 
find itself fighting for survival. 
CONCLUSION: OF LAWS AND SAUSAGES . . .  
To be sure, there are regulatory issues to be explored other than the 
ones detailed herein in an effort to hone the blade of culpability for the two-
year economic freefall. The bizarre alliance of private and public flaws that 
caused the Crisis perhaps serve to isolate any one contributor from blame. 
One could easily ask whether the 1970 NYSE decision to allow investment 
firms to go public foretold of the days when management would place 
quarterly profits above fundamental corporate health.281 
Frightfully scarce from critiques to date are detailed studies of the 
oversight of major firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers by the 
stock exchanges—those entities that are only permitted to utilize the 
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moniker “national securities exchange” in return for guaranteeing to the 
government that, in addition to serving as centers of capital formation and 
transfer, they will simultaneously serve as self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs).282 SRO examination for violations and transgressions is made 
possible by the separate requirement that exchange member firms file a 
monthly Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single (FOCUS) 
report detailing the firm’s financial condition.283 Yet, no cries have been 
heard for either gross reform at the SRO level, or, alternatively, to eradicate 
its obsolete warning system. Likewise, while the serious questions and 
drastic ramifications abound, it is not altogether clear that the public wishes 
to hold aggressive entrepreneurs accountable via criminal actions.284 
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The analyses conducted by this Article served to illustrate that any 
hindsight needs to be a movie reel as opposed to a snapshot, and that the 
camera needs to focus more on the risk incentives permitted to prosper on 
trading desks than on any trendy investment vehicles engaged thereby. 
Clearly, the judiciary and the White House played an often downplayed yet 
smoldering role in creating that risky climate; clearly Congress and the SEC 
can bring on a cloudy day in a heartbeat. 
Thus, as the GLBA and ill-advised SEC policies emerge as the most 
damaging contributions to the Crisis, the expedient blame attributed to the 
growth of the CDO or the CFMA’s exclusion of a sole investment product 
seems too expedient. In light of management’s commitment to non-
traditional structures and profit centers (both in anticipation of and after 
enactment of the law), a related flaw in recent years appears to be in 
government failing to commensurately staff and train the agencies. This is 
supported by the words of Alan Greenspan, who in his speech to Congress 
in October 2008 outlined the failures of Washington to comprehend the 
regulatory task at hand, stating: 
“I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, 
specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of 
protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms”. . . . “And 
it’s been my experience, having worked both as a regulator for eighteen 
years and similar quantities in the private sector, especially ten years at a 
major international bank, . . . that the loan officers of those institutions 
knew far more about the risks involved in the people to whom they lent 
money than I saw even our best regulators at the Fed capable of 
doing.”285 
To make Wall Sreet appreciate the value of regulating itself thus seems 
ideal. The concept may even be said to be historical. It was FDR himself 
who, when introducing the first of the federal securities laws, noted that the 
government could not vet all the nation’s stock offerings;286 the spirit of that 
advice bears repeating as regulators scramble to find the cure for 
malingering economic woes 
Undoubtedly, the government plays a critical role in instilling such 
diligence. As detailed herein, four vital sectors of government contributed 
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to the atmospheric change attending the Crisis. “The movement to 
deregulate the financial industry went too far by exaggerating the 
resilience—the self-healing powers—of laissez-faire capitalism,” a pioneer 
of the Chicago School of economics recently wrote.287 Maybe so, but, upon 
inspection of the verdicts of populist trials, it appears that it was still agents 
of the government who often helped to sell us the snake oil. As economist 
and journalist Paul Krugman has argued: “Influential figures should have 
proclaimed a simple rule: anything that does what a bank does, anything 
that has to be rescued in crises the way banks are, should be regulated like a 
bank.”288 
This Article sought to test public perceptions of (and consequentially 
specifically apportion blame to) an array of government sectors. As the 
lingering autopsy of the 14,000 Dow Jones Industrial Average continues, 
heightened scrutiny by Washington, D.C. appears mainly to cast blame in 
old directions. This author thus suggests that the compass point towards an 
amalgamated inquiry: The existing laws and framework failed simply to 
instill in sophisticates the need to protect themselves from other 
sophisticates. For, if all our scrutiny of financial relationships continues to 
sound in metaphors involving sheep and wolves,289 we may never reach the 
requisite understanding that the Crisis was caused by the well-heeled 
fooling the well-heeled.290 
Despite any controversy about the true author of the “laws and 
sausages” quote, no one contests that the great Twain did advise so long 
ago: “[N]o country can be well governed unless its citizens as a body keep 
religiously before their minds that they are guardians of the law, and that 
the law officers are only the machinery for its execution, nothing more.”291 
Clearly, that machinery broke down in recent times, chiefly in keeping 
iconic sophisticates from fatal avenues of speculation. Hopefully, a 
progressive survey of the lessened defenses that allowed Wall Street to fail 
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to comprehend the dangers of Wall Street will aid in our collective repair of 
those engines. 
